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Shuri Castle and Japanese Castles: A Controversial Heritage
Oleg Benesch, Ran Zwigenberg
On October 31, 2019, a massive fire tore through
the UNESCO World Heritage site of Shuri Castle
in  Okinawa,  sparking  a  global  reaction  and
comparisons with the recent fire at Notre Dame,
another World Heritage site.  As in the case of
Notre  Dame,  government  officials  immediately
declared their intention to rebuild, and donations
flooded  in  from  throughout  Japan  and  other
countries.  The  scale  of  the  response  to  Shuri
Castle is also a reflection of the position of castles
as some of Japan ?s most popular and important
heritage sites. This could recently be seen in the
case  of  the  Kumamoto  Earthquake  of  2016,  a
major disaster which killed at least fifty people
and  injured  thousands  more.  Amidst  the
extensive  destruction  and  loss  of  life,  it  was
drone  footage  of  the  damaged  towers  of  the
Kumamoto Castle keep (tenshu) and walls that
was shown by major news agencies around the
world.  The  castle,  which  had  long  been  an
important site of local pride and identity, quickly
became the symbol of both the earthquake and
subsequent  efforts  by  Kumamoto  residents  to
rebuild and recover.
In the case of the Shuri fire, although there were
no casualties, the disturbance caused by the fire
and  commotion  would  have  been  especially
distressing  for  many  residents  given  the
devastating wartime experiences that destroyed
the castle in 1945, compounded by the ongoing
militarization of the island by the United States.
After the initial shock of the fire, many concerns
(https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/
22/national/shuri-fire-threatens-okinawas-
tourism-crafts/#.XdeqSjIzai4)  relate to the lack of
skilled  artisans  for  the  reconstruction  and  the
economic  impact  on  tourism,  as  millions  of
people visit the castle each year. The significance
of Shuri Castle to many is reflected in the surge
o f  p u b l i c  d o n a t i o n s
(https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/12/
01/national/donations-rebuilding-okinawa-
shuri-castle/#.XeS_AtXLdPZ)  to reconstruct the
site,  which reached 1.2  billion  Yen during the
first month after the fire. An important element
of discussion is the symbolic importance of the
site and its relationship to broader controversies
in  Okinawa  today.  International  headlines
lamented  the  loss  of  the   ᰀ500-year  old  world
h e r i t a g e  s i t e  ?
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-5024
4169)  and   ?600-year-old  Shuri  Castle  complex
(https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/
article/3035649/fire-engulfs-japans-600-year-old-
shuri-castle-world-heritage), ?  but  coverage  also
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mentioned that the castle had been extensively
rebuilt in 1992 before being designated a World
Heritage site in 2000.
The Main Hall of Shuri Castle before the fire.
Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons
(https:/ / commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/ File:Naha
_Shuri_Castle20s5s3200.jpg) .
The focus of media coverage has generally been
on the role of Shuri Castle as the symbol of the
former Ryukyu Kingdom, which conquered and
ruled various parts of the Ryukyu Islands, from
about the late fifteenth century. It was at this time
that the castle was given its present Chinese-
influenced design, as part of King Shō Shin ?s
(1465-1527) centralization of power. The castle
had looked quite different before burning to the
ground in the 1450s during a civil war among the
Shō family.1 Coverage has stressed the
importance of Shuri Castle for many Okinawans,
who have long been victims of discrimination as
well as violence by both the Japanese state and
the US military, which stations roughly half of its
54,000 Japan-based troops in Okinawa, even
though the islands are only 1% of Japan ?s land
area. In contrast, local narratives have sought to
promote a narrative of Okinawan and Ryukyuan
culture as traditionally peaceful and outward
looking.
Shuri Castle ?s important role in the turbulent
modern history of Okinawa has left many
unresolved historical issues and contemporary
controversies. The castle was a central site of the
devastating Battle of Okinawa in early summer
1945, when tens of thousands of Okinawan
civilians were killed in the fighting including
some who died as a result of  ᰀcompulsory mass
suicides ᴀ directed by the Imperial Japanese
Army. The IJA had turned the castle into its
headquarters, with countless tunnels and caves,
and the site was almost entirely destroyed in the
battle. After Japan ?s surrender in 1945, Okinawa
remained under US control until 1971, serving as
an important base for both the Korean War and
Vietnam War. When Okinawa reverted to its
former status as a Japanese prefecture, the US
military retained and subsequently expanded the
heavy presence that continues to cause
considerable resentment.
Shuri Castle is an eloquent witness to the larger
histories of the Ryukyu Kingdom and
subsequently Okinawa Prefecture, which are in
many ways unique within Japan. The castle has
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significant architectural differences from
mainland Japanese castles, which developed into
their final form in the late sixteenth century, and
are usually marked by deep moats, angled stone
walls, and towering wooden keeps at their
centers. Their very large scale reflects the power
and wealth of their builders, as well as the
intensity of the warfare that swept across all of
Japan at the time. In contrast, Shuri Castle ?s large
central hall, curving curtain walls, and dry moats
are some of its prominent unique elements, and
its scale is closer to that of some of Japan ?s
smaller regional castles. Tze May Loo has
recently highlighted the centrality of Shuri Castle
to debates on heritage in Okinawa, arguing that
Shuri is a critical site for understanding the
development of the islands ? complex relationship
with mainland Japan.2 Certainly, many people
have made the case that Okinawa became Japan ?s
first colony, and that its residents suffered greatly
under domination by Satsuma, Japan, and the
United States. On the other hand, the theme of
resistance is insufficient to explain Okinawa ?s
modern history. Many Okinawans desired
acceptance as Japanese in the imperial period,
especially, and sought to take advantage of
benefits as citizens of a major empire, including
through migration to mainland Japan and
overseas.3
 
Curving walls and stone gates of Shuri Castle.
Photo courtesy of Greg Smits.
In  the  debates  surrounding  Okinawa ?s
relationship  with  more  powerful  states,  Shuri
Castle  has  often been held up as  a  symbol  of
Ryukyuan or Okinawan identity, with its history
of  being  occupied,  neglected,  sacrificed,
destroyed, and recovered reflecting the fate of the
islands ?  inhabitants.  While  this  narrative  is
enticing and Shuri Castle can tell us a great deal
about  larger  historical  processes,  such  an
approach can also be problematic  insofar  as  it
considers Shuri in isolation from other castles in
mainland  Japan.  Many  of  the  dynamics
surrounding Shuri  Castle  are  representative  of
developments  in  other  castle  sites  and  reflect
broader  policies  toward  Japanese  castles  and
heritage, and were not limited to Okinawa.
We argue that the significance of Shuri Castle can
only be fully understood by examining it in the
context  of  castles  in  modern  Japan.  By
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understanding the commonalities and differences
Shuri Castle has with mainland castles, we can
more effectively use the site as a tool to examine
Okinawa ?s modern history. In this study, we look
at Shuri Castle relative to other castles in Japan,
providing  points  of  departure  for  further
research on Shuri and other sites as witnesses of
modern history. In spite of Shuri ?s early origins
and  architecture  differing  somewhat  from
mainland  Japanese  castles,  it  was  treated
similarly  to  these  other  sites  in  the  modern
period. Like hundreds of other castles, Shuri was
taken over by the central government in the early
Meiji  period  (1868-1912).  Like  dozens  of  other
castles,  Shuri  eventually became a garrison for
the modern military. Like the castles at Nagoya,
Hiroshima,  Wakayama,  Okayama,  Ogaki,  and
Fukuyama,  it  was  destroyed  by  US  bombs  in
1945 .  L ike  many  other  cas t les ,  i t  was
demilitarized under the US Occupation and came
to  host  cultural  and  educational  facilities.  The
reconstruction of Shuri Castle from wood using
traditional  techniques  in  1992  echoed  similar
projects  at  Kanazawa,  Kakegawa,  and Ōzu,  as
well as dozens of planned reconstructions. 1992
also saw the designation of Himeji Castle as one
of  Japan ?s  first  two  UNESCO  World  Heritage
sites,  eight  years  before  Shuri  received  that
designation. For many regions in Japan, castles
have played a similar role to Shuri,  serving at
times as symbols of connection to the nation, and
at times as symbols of a local identity opposed to
the often oppressive power of the central state.
Examining the modern history of Shuri Castle as
a  Japanese  castle  can  further  complicate  our
understandings  of  the  complex  dynamics  of
Okinawa ?s relationship with Japan over the past
150 years.
 
Shuri Castle as a castle in imperial Japan
 
One of the fundamental issues surrounding Shuri
Castle is its very status as a castle, with various
groups arguing that it was either a fortification or
a palace, or both. The Chinese character typically
translated as  ᰀcastle ? (城, shiro, jō) had a range
of  meanings  throughout  its  history,  and could
refer to cities, castles, and even the Great Wall of
China. In the narratives that stress the peaceful
heritage  of  the  Ryukyu  Kingdom,  Shuri  is
primarily  a  palace  that  hosted  diplomatic
exchanges with China, Japan, and other states in
the  premodern  period.  This  message  is
epitomized  by  the  Shureimon  -  the  Gate  of
Courtesy  that  was  originally  built  in  1579,
reconstructed after the Second World War, and is
featured  on  the  2000-Yen  note.4  Shuri  Palace
certainly fulfilled all of these roles. In a different
reading,  however,  Shuri  Castle  was  a  site  of
Shuri  ?s  power  and  authori ty  over  the
surrounding islands. Starting in the mid fifteenth
century  under  King  Shō  Taikyū  (r.  1454-1460)
and culminating in King Shō Shin ?s (r. 1477-1526)
wars  of  conquest,  Shuri  became  the  center  of
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what  one  historian  has  called  a   ᰀRyukyu
empire, ? created and held in place by military
force.5 In 1609, this empire was subjugated by the
Japanese domain of  Satsuma,  which controlled
Ryukyu from that point until the late nineteenth
century.6
The  status  of  Shuri  as  a  castle  and/or  palace
raises an important question for other castles in
Japan,  which also  served as  both  fortifications
and residences of regional rulers. As in the case
of Shuri, the military and peaceful functions of
Japanese castles have been stressed at different
times in the modern period, in line with local and
national agendas. In this sense, reading Shuri as a
castle,  just  as  one  would  approach  Japanese
castles, provides a useful comparison. Soon after
the  Meij i  Restoration,  in  1871,  the  new
government  undertook  a  major  administrative
reform  in  which  it   ᰀabolished  domains  and
established prefectures ? (haihan chiken), greatly
reducing the number of organizational units in
the country. As part of this reform, the regional
ruling  families   ᰀreturned ?  their  castles  to  the
emperor and were obliged to move permanently
to the new imperial capital of Tokyo to reduce
the  danger  of  military  challenges  to  the  new
state.  Governors  were  appointed to  the  newly
created  prefectures,  and  many  castles  were
converted  into  administrative  centers,  while
others were taken over by the growing imperial
army. In this sense, the forced relocation of the
Ryukyuan King Shō Tai (1843-1901) to Tokyo in
1879 to become a marquis, and the establishment
of  Okinawa Prefecture  the  same year  under  a
centrally appointed governor, were very much in
line with practice throughout Japan.7
It is important to note that although castles were
large and valuable urban spaces in the early Meiji
period, they were also viewed largely as useless
and even embarrassing reminders of the recent
 ᰀfeudal ?  past,  and  potential  obstacles  to
modernization.  Militarily,  castles  had  been
obsolete for centuries,  and their  upkeep was a
major drain on domain budgets during the Edo
period  (1603-1868).  Daimyo  across  Japan  had
long  desired  to  tear  their  castles  down,  and
dozens  of  requests  for  permission  to  do  so
flooded into Tokyo from the domains in the first
years  of  the  Meiji  period.8  Hundreds  of  castle
structures  were  torn  down or  removed in  the
1870s.  This  was  motivated  to  a  considerable
degree by the economic difficulties of the local
administrations who now had to pay for castle
maintenance, as well as the financial troubles of
the former samurai class,  whose stipends were
reduced and finally eliminated.  Obsolete castle
buildings were often sold off for scrap to raise
money for former samurai, who in some regions
were also allowed to use moats and other spaces
for agriculture.9
Edo Castle,  the former home of the Tokugawa
shoguns and the largest castle in Japan, suffered
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a similar fate. It was already in a significant state
of  decay  in  the  1860s,  even  if  the  bloodless
surrender  of  the  castle  to  the  imperial  loyalist
armies in 1868 prevented further damage. It was
decided in the early 1870s to tear the castle down,
and there is little existing evidence of many of the
original buildings at the time. Photographs taken
by various foreigners in the 1860s and 1870s are
important resources.10  Foreigners were typically
more  intrigued  by  Japanese  castles  than  were
Japanese  in  the  1870s,  and many photographs
from the time were taken or commissioned by
foreigners.11  Edo Castle was also the site of an
unusual event, when the art specialist Ninagawa
Noritane  (1835-82)  obtained  permission  to
photograph the castle  in 1871 shortly before it
was  demolished.  Ninagawa  had  close  ties  to
foreigners and was highly aware of developing
heritage and display practices in the West. Judith
Vitale further places Ninagawa ?s project within
larger discourses on the Romantic appreciation of
ruins that was highly influential at the time.12
 
Photo of Edo Castle from Ninagawa Noritane ?s
1871 project.
Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons
(https:/ / ja.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ファイ
ル:Kami_Bairin-Mon.jpg) .
See online version of Ninagawa ?s book.
(http:/ / www.emuseum.jp/ detail/ 100813/ 000/ 000)
(http://www.emuseum.jp/detail/100813/000/0
00)
Accounts by foreigners provide some of the most
revealing insights regarding attitudes towards
castles in the early Meiji period. The German
diplomat Max von Brandt was involved in the
decision to save the keep of Nagoya Castle,
which was slated for demolition in the early
1870s.13 Christopher Dresser recalled conflicts
between civilian and military authorities over
control of Nagoya Castle when he visited in
1876.14 The traveler Francis Guillemard
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(1852-1933) took the only surviving photographs
of the Takamatsu Castle keep before it was
destroyed in 1884. These were only recently
rediscovered in Cambridge University Library
and have been vital to an ongoing movement to
rebuild the castle.15
On his journey aboard the Marchesa in the early
1880s, Guillemard also visited Okinawa and
Shuri Castle, and provided a detailed account.
According to Guillemard, the castle was highly
restricted, and he describes being  ᰀconducted to
the fortress, whither none of the crowd who had
hitherto surrounded us were permitted to
follow. ?16 Guillemard was impressed by the  ᰀvast
area that is included within the fortifications, ?
organized within  ᰀthree distinct lines of
fortifications, with ample space between them for
the maneuvering of any number of troops. ᴀ Like
Japanese castles, this was certainly a military site,
if an obsolete one:  ᰀIn the present day of large
ordnance, these wonderful defences would, of
course, be reduced with the greatest of ease, but,
in the old days of bow and arrow and hand-to-
hand fighting they might just have been
considered impregnable. ?17 As he moved
towards the center of the castle, he discovered
 ᰀbarracks, or rather what serve as such at the
present time, for we discovered that about two
hundred Japanese soldiers were stationed there.
In the large courtyard surrounded by these
buildings we came across a small squad of them
drilling. ?18 He finally reached the palace at the
very center of the castle, the first Western visitor
to do so:  ᰀA more dismal sight could hardly have
been imagined. We wandered through room
after room, through corridors, reception-halls,
women ?s apartments, through the servants ?
quarters, through a perfect labyrinth of buildings,
which were in a state of indescribable
dilapidation. The place could not have been
inhabited for years. Every article of ornament
had been removed.  & In all directions the
woodwork had been torn away for firewood, and
an occasional ray of light from above showed
that the roof was in no better condition than the
rest of the building. ?19
 
From Guillemard (1889),  ᰀThe Inner Line of
Fortifications, Shiuri (sic). ?
 
Guillemard, a keen observer, hinted at tensions
between the Japanese rulers and the local
populace.  ᰀI had a great desire to get at further
particulars of the state of the island under its new
rulers and tried our new friend (a Japanese
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officer) and Uyeno (Guillemard ?s guide) upon
the subject, but in vain. The latter, who, if he
chose, could be intelligent enough, suddenly
became hopelessly stupid, and after a few
reiterated questions à travers, I gave up the task
in despair. ?20 Similarly, when they came across
the soldiers drilling,  ᰀUyeno was evidently rather
disturbed at this incident, being apparently
desirous that we should remain in ignorance of
the fact that the castle was now occupied by
Japanese troops. ?21 Guillemard ?s experience
seems to imply a difference from the Japanese
mainland, where the army very openly occupied
and controlled castle spaces, although there were
tensions between castle garrisons and civilian
populations everywhere in Japan.
We should be hesitant to presume that the state
of the castle is evidence of Japanese
discrimination against Okinawans, or that
neglect of the castle by the Japanese military and
other bodies was part of a desire to assimilate
Okinawa and erase Ryukyuan culture. Nor
should we assume that Japanese policies towards
Shuri Castle were driven by concern that it could
prove a rallying point for anti-Japanese feeling at
the time. While these larger trends certainly
existed, the state of castles in mainland Japan was
no different. Both military and civilian castles
were in advanced states of decay in the 1880s,
and there was little effort to preserve either in
most of the country. Furthermore, policy towards
castles does not generally seem to have varied
between domains that had been loyal to the
Tokugawa shogunate and those that supported
the victorious imperial loyalist armies. For
example, the keeps of both Hagi Castle and Aizu-
Wakamatsu Castle were torn down largely for
practical reasons in 1874, but these actions were
only ascribed political motivations many decades
later.22
Similarly, the occupation of Shuri Castle by the
military reflected practice throughout Japan,
where disused castle sites were taken over by the
newly-formed Imperial Japanese Army in the
early Meiji period. The first six regional army
commands were all located in castles, as were
almost all of the first 24 infantry regiments
created in the years leading up to the Sino-
Japanese War in 1894.23 Many of these vast urban
spaces that had been restricted spaces of power
and authority in the early modern period
continued to serve this function after 1868, now
with modern barracks and parade grounds, and
sentry posts in front of medieval gates. As in the
case of Shuri ᐀or even Okinawa today ᐀many
civilians in Japanese cities experienced the
military as vital to the local economy, but also as
an oppressive and disruptive force. Throughout
Japan, especially in the Taisho period
(1912-1926), civil society groups sought in vain to
remove the army from urban castle garrisons to
suburban sites where the problems associated
with the presence of thousands of young soldiers
would be less immediately felt.24
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Barracks in Himeji Castle with keep in the
background (1908).
Postcard in authors ? collection.
 
Imperial General Headquarters in Hiroshima
Castle with keep in background (late Meiji
period).
Postcard in authors ? collection.
 ᰀThe Headquarters of the Six (sic) Army
Division ᴀ in Kumamoto Castle (late Meiji
period).
Postcard in authors ? collection.
 
The  general  neglect  of  many  mainland  castles
lasted  well  into  the  twentieth  century.  As  the
writer Tokutomi Roka (1868-1927) described the
dilapidated keep at  Matsue Castle  in  1916,   ᰀit
seemed  as  though  a  feudal  ghost  might
appear. ?25  The keep of Echizen Maruoka Castle
was also used as a makeshift shrine, with pillars
removed for the altar and a large window cut in
to let in more light.26 Across Japan, both military
and civilian  administrators  did  not  hesitate  to
tear down walls and other structures, fill moats
for roads and railway lines, and sell off parts of
castles for other uses, including the building of
schools and administrative buildings, agriculture
and  sports,  and  even  horse  racing  and  cycle
tracks.27 Similarly, the great hall of Shuri Castle
was used as a barracks by the army until 1896,
when the Okinawa Normal School took over the
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center of  the site and used the main hall  as a
dormitory.28
It  was only in the early twentieth century that
castles  began  to  be  appreciated  by  the  public
throughout the country on a broader scale  for
their aesthetic and heritage value. Military castles
were opened to the citizenry on the occasion of
annual  regimental  festivals,  which  were  major
events  on the  social  calendar.  Natsume Sōseki
recounts the celebratory atmosphere during such
a  festival  in  Matsuyama  in  his  1906  novel
Botchan.29  These  events  became  especially
popular  after  the  Sino-Japanese  (1894-95)  and
R u s s o - J a p a n e s e  ( 1 9 0 4 - 0 5 )  w a r s ,  a s
commemoration of the war dead took place in
 ᰀsoul-gathering  shrines ?  (shōkonsha),  often
located on parade grounds or in civilian castle
parks.30  Castles  were  also  popular  sites  for
industrial  exhibitions,  both  on  military  parade
grounds  and  in  civilian  parks.  At  the  Fifth
National Industrial Exhibition in Osaka in 1903,
the  Aichi  Prefecture  Pavilion  was  built  in  the
shape of a castle,  reflecting Nagoya ?s status as
having the largest surviving keep in Japan.31 This
pattern continued into the postwar, as Aichi and
Nagoya pavilions were often built  as imitation
castles. Castles were also used as airfields and to
demonstrate  the  new  aviation  technology,
drawing  very  large  crowds  in  cities  including
Nagoya and Osaka.32
 
Aichi Prefecture Pavilion at Fifth National
Industrial Exhibition in Osaka (1903).
Courtesy of the National Diet Library.
 
The first decade of the twentieth century also saw
the first attempts to reconstruct lost keeps within
castles. The keep at Kōfu Castle was temporarily
reconstructed on the occasion of an exhibition in
1906,  adorned  with  bright  electric  lights  in  a
marriage of traditional architecture and modern
technology.33  In  1910,  the  Gifu  Society  for  the
Preservation  of  Beautiful  Scenery  (hoshōkai)
undertook a more permanent reconstruction of
its  lost  castle  keep,  using  materials  from  a
disused  rail  bridge  that  was  being  replaced.34
This project is significant not only because it was
the first lasting reconstruction, but also because it
was  undertaken  by  a  civil  society  group
interested in heritage preservation. These groups
became  increasingly  widespread  and  active  in
the  Taisho  period  (1912-1926),  and  had  an
important role in promoting the appreciation of
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castle heritage and preservation.35 In the case of
Shuri Castle, although efforts did not extend as
far  as  reconstruction,  the  first  years  of  the
twentieth century also saw the first movements
by local authorities toward obtaining ownership
of the castle for public use as a museum, park,
and historical site, echoing similar developments
elsewhere.36
The growth of preservation groups was closely
related to the development of heritage legislation
in modern Japan. The Old Shrines and Temples
Preservation Act was passed in 1897, but did not
cover secular structures such as castles.  It  was
only with the passage of the National Treasures
Preservation Law in 1929 that castles were given
heritage protection and funding.37  Although no
castle  keeps  were  torn  down  in  the  early
twentieth century, they only began to be formally
protected using national legislation in the 1930s.
Some, such as Nagoya and Odawara, enjoyed a
modicum of  protection  during  a  period  when
they served as  Imperial  Detached Palaces,  but
even  the  imperial  household  was  prone  to
making significant alterations to castle sites.38 In
this  context,  the  case  of  Shuri  Castle  is  an
interesting  departure  from  practice  regarding
castles on the Japanese mainland. The site was
judged  to  have  reached  too  severe  a  state  of
decay to merit repair by the early 1920s, and the
military  made  plans  to  pull  the  palace  down.
This decision was reflected in similar moves at
other castles in Japan, and should not be seen as
ideological  or  restricted  to  Okinawa.  At  this
point,  the  architect  Itō  Chūta  intervened  to
preserve  the  historic  buildings.  While  he  was
based in the Japanese mainland, Itō had traveled
extensively and published studies of Ryukyuan
architecture.  Itō  also  knew  that  castles
everywhere remained under threat, especially in
regions  like  Shuri  with  limited  financial
resources  to  invest  in  heritage  protection.
 
Okinawa Shrine in Shuri Castle, imperial
period.
Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons
(https:/ / commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/ File:Okin
awa_Jinja_haiden.jpg) .
 
Itō ?s strategy to save Shuri Castle was a clever
ploy that made use of existing heritage
legislation. As this did not cover castles, but did
cover shrines, it was decided to designate the
palace as Okinawa Shrine, thereby making it
eligible for public support and protection. The
establishment of shrines within castles was
 APJ | JF 17 | 24 | 3
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widespread throughout Japan at the time.
Former ruling families often established shrines
to their ancestors in their castles in the Meiji
period, thereby creating new sites of worship as
alternatives to existing Buddhist temples, which
often represented a considerable financial
burden.39 Shrines were also established in castles
to celebrate national heroes, while dozens of
civilian and military castles contained shōkonsha
shrines to worship the war dead. These shrines,
which were affiliated with the Yasukuni Shrine
in Tokyo, were converted to  ᰀnation-protecting
shrines ᴀ (gokoku jinja) in 1939 to deal with the
increasing number of war dead. There was
roughly one gokoku jinja per prefecture, with
others found in imperial possessions overseas.
Even today, dozens of castles contain gokoku
jinja that are reminders of the role of castles in
the imperial past.
 
The Himeji Gokoku Jinja with the castle keep
in the background.
Photo by the authors, 2018.
 
In this context, although the designation of the
Shuri  palace  as  a  shrine  was  unique  as  an
approach to heritage legislation, it was not at all
unusual in terms of the links between religion
and castles  throughout  Japan at  the  time.  The
designation as a shrine was certainly driven by
mainland  Japanese,  but  this  was  primarily  in
order to save the site as part of a movement that
was also led by mainlanders. In this way, Shuri
was the  first  castle  in  Japan to  receive  official
protection,  five  years  before  Nagoya  Castle
became  the  first  site  covered  under  new
legislation  passed  in  1929.  Furthermore,  as
Gregory  Smits  has  shown,  the  notion  of  a
uniform Okinawan identity around the turn of
the twentieth century was a reaction to mainland
efforts  to  incorporate  the  islands  into  its
expanding empire. Smits notes that Okinawans
 ᰀsimultaneously  became  both  Ryukyuan  and
Japanese. ?40 Being Japanese was a growing part
of  Okinawan identity,  and many accepted  the
incorporation into Japan, seeking a greater role in
the  empire.41  Seen  through  this  prism,  the
acceptance  of  the  Okinawa  Shrine  was  not
unusual.
Castles in wartime Japan
 
The early Showa period (1926-1989) saw a variety
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of trends related to castles in Japan, and Shuri
was no exception.  One important development
was the academic study of castles in tandem with
greater public interest. The reconstruction of the
Osaka Castle keep from steel-reinforced concrete
in  1928-31  revealed  a  shortage  of  specialist
knowledge  on  castle  construction,  and  also
inspired  a  boom  in  academic  and  popular
engagement.  Graduate students in architectural
history, especially, began to examine castles, and
the most influential scholars and architects of the
early  postwar  were  trained  in  the  1930s  and
1940s, some supported by the Imperial Japanese
Army. 4 2  Here  again,  Shuri  Castle  was  a
forerunner,  having  been  studied  by  Itō  in  the
early 1920s, whereas dedicated studies of castles
in mainland Japan only began to appear at the
end of that decade.43 In 1931, the center of Osaka
Castle  was  opened  as  a  public  park,  and  the
imperial household gave Nagoya Castle keep to
the municipality for the same purpose (and to
avoid the financial burden of major repairs). The
change in heritage legislation in 1929 to include
more  recent  structures  meant  that  castles
qualified  for  the  first  time,  with  the  keep  at
Nagoya designated the first  National Treasure.
Himeji,  Sendai,  Okayama,  Fukuyama,  and
Hiroshima  followed in  1931,  and  Shuri  Castle
was formally designated a National Treasure in
its own right as a castle, rather than as a shrine,
in 1933. By 1935, sixteen castles throughout Japan
had been designated National Treasures.44
 
 ᰀOsakajo Park and Castle Tower Reconstructed
by Citizen (sic), ᴀ 1930s.
Postcard in the authors ? collection.
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 ᰀHis Majesty ?s Gift, Nagoya Castle ᴀ (1936),
commemorating the emperor giving the keep to
the city.
Postcard in the authors ? collection.
 
Castles benefited from increasing pride in, and
mobilization  of,  Japan ?s  martial  history  and
heritage in the service of the nation and empire.
The  military  made  increasing  symbolic  and
practical use of castles in the early Showa period,
especially  during  the  Fifteen  Year  War  with
China (1931-1945). Castles increasingly featured
in military propaganda and were celebrated as
physical  manifestations  of  the   ᰀway  of  the
samurai ?  (bushidō),  while  the  soldiers  that
occupied  castle  garrisons  were  seen  as  the
spiritual  heirs  of  Japan ?s  heavily  idealized
ancient  warriors.  The  Kwantung  Army
Headquarters in Xinjing, Manchuria, was built to
resemble the castles that the army occupied back
home. In Japan, both military and civilian castles
held  major  National  Defense  Exhibitions  and
public military maneuvers, while the increasing
number of war dead were commemorated at the
gokoku  shrines.  Also,  in  the  1930s,  as  Justin
Aukema has argued, Shuri Castle became a point
of convergence for the assimilation of Okinawans
into  the  Japanese  Empire,  both  as  a  physical
symbol of their ancient  ᰀJapaneseness ? and as a
site  for  inculcating  the  imperial  ideology  into
high school students.45
 
 ᰀHeadquarters of the Kwanto (Kwantung)
Army and Japanese Embassy,
Hsin-Ching (Xinjing) ᴀ (late 1930s).
Postcard in the authors ? collection.
In the early 1940s, military castles focused on
their role as garrisons, and many castles were
again restricted. In Osaka, the windows of the
castle keep were covered over in 1940 to block
views of the military garrison and arsenal, and
the keep was closed to the public entirely in
1942.46 As military sites, castles had been
involved in all of Japan ?s modern wars, but never
more so than during the Pacific War. US
bombing destroyed six original castle keeps,
including the civilian castles at Wakayama,
Fukuyama, Ogaki, and Okayama, as well as the
large watchtower at Mito. Castle keeps in
military garrisons were also destroyed, including
at Nagoya and Hiroshima. The latter was blown
over by the shockwave from the atomic bomb,
which completely destroyed the military
command and Hiroshima Gokoku Shrine that
shared the main bailey of the castle. The concrete
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keep at Osaka was damaged by bombs but
survived largely intact. The keep of Himeji Castle
had been covered by camouflage netting to hide
it from American bombers, although its survival
was arguably less due to this precautionary
measure than to the US military ?s policy of
targeting working-class residential areas in
bombing raids of 1945. In Himeji, the greatest
destruction was in the bombing of the mixed
residential and industrial zone in the East of the
city.47
 
The Nagoya Castle keep burning due to US
bombing, May 14, 1945
Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons
(https:/ / commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/ File:Burn
ing_Nagoya_Castle-2.JPG) .
 
As in Japanese castles,  the fate of Shuri Castle
was  closely  linked to  that  of  the  military  that
occupied it. However, the situation at Shuri also
differed in very significant ways, as it was the
only castle to see actual combat rather than aerial
bombing  alone.  Students  were  enlisted  by  the
Japanese 32nd Army to dig a maze of tunnels
underneath  the  castle  for  a  new  military
headquarters.48 By transforming the castle into an
explicit  military  site  that  housed  many
commanding  officers,  the  army  made  Shuri  a
target that the US army was especially keen to
take.49 The Battle of Okinawa in April-June 1945
was one of the most violent and tragic episodes
of the war, especially with regard to the civilian
p o p u l a t i o n .
(https://apjjf.org/2017/20/Rabson.html%20)
One particularly controversial aspects is what has
come to be known as a policy of  ᰀcompulsory
mass  suicide, ?  Japanese  soldiers  encouraged
Okinawan civilians hiding in caves and bunkers
to  kill  themselves  using  grenades  and  other
methods rather than surrender. They also killed
countless civilians to prevent them from using up
food and other resources, or to ensure that the
official  image  that  the  Japanese  people  would
choose  death  over  surrender  was  maintained.
The  killing  of  Okinawans  both  around  Shuri
Castle and elsewhere on the islands were among
the  greatest  tragedies  of  the  war,  with  some
estimating  that  civilian  casualties  may  have
n u m b e r e d  1 6 0 , 0 0 0 .
(https://apjjf.org/2017/20/Rabson.html%20)
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While the vast majority of civilians in Okinawa
and elsewhere were killed by US bombing and
shelling,  this  was  exacerbated by the  Japanese
army ?s  generally  dismissive  view  of  civilians.
This was also the case on the Japanese mainland,
with arsenal  workers  in  Osaka and elsewhere,
including many women and children, forced to
work  through  bombing  raids,  resulting  in
massive casualties. In Okinawa, this disdain for
the  civilian  population  was  exacerbated  by
linguistic and cultural differences that led to far
more violent treatment of the local population by
the military.
 
 ᰀLiberation ᴀ and Occupation
 
From the first  moments  of  its  postwar  history
Shuri  Castle  was  already  a  controversial  site.
According to Eugene Sledge, a US marine who
participated in the Battle  of  Okinawa, the first
flag  that  was  planted  over  the  ruins  of  Shuri
Castle was not the US but the Confederate flag.
Sledge  recalled,   ᰀin  the  morning  [of  May  29,
1945] . . . Marines had attacked eastward into the
ruins  of  Shuri  Castle  and  had  raised  the
Confederate flag. When we learned that the flag
of  the  Confederacy had been hoisted over  the
very heart and soul of Japanese resistance, all of
us  Southerners  cheered  loudly.  The  Yankees
among  us  grumbled. ?50  The  flag  was  later
replaced  with  the  US  flag  that  flew  over
Guadalcanal,  ᰀa fitting tribute to the men of the
1st Marine Division who had been first into the
Japanese Citadel. ?51 The incident is still a topic of
controversy  in  the  US.5 2  For  Okinawans,
however, it mattered little what flag the foreign
occupiers raised over the pile of rubble that was
once Shuri Castle. US artillery had reduced the
castle to what American reporters described as a
 ᰀcrater-of-the-moon  landscape. ?53  The  physical
destruction extended beyond the buildings to the
natural environment. As Senge Tetsuma recalled,
 ᰀthe entire edifice and the surrounding forests
were destroyed in the flames of the recent Great
War and in vain the only thing you see are stone
hedges and withered broken trees. ?54 The human
cost  was incalculable  with almost  a  quarter  of
Okinawa ?s  prewar  population  perishing  at  the
hands of both the US army and their Japanese
 ᰀdefenders. ?
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US Marine raising the flag atop Shuri Castle
after the Battle of Okinawa.
Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons (link)
 
The fall of the castle,  ᰀthe very heart and soul of
Japanese resistance, ? was a significant symbolic
victory for the Americans, and the site continued
to play a significant role in the reconstruction of
the island under US occupation. Shortly after the
US  takeover ,  the  Uni ted  S ta tes  C iv i l
Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR)
decided to raze the ruins of the castle and build
in its place a new  ᰀUniversity of the Ryukyus. ?
The  university  was  established  under  the
guidance of Michigan State University. As Mire
Koikari  writes,   ᰀthe  establishment  of  [the
University of the Ryukyus] in 1951 [was] another
example of Cold War cultural strategies, [which]
mobilized higher education as a central vehicle of
the  dissemination  of  US  values,  culture,
education,  and  technology. ?55  Such  strategies
were  deployed  throughout  the  developing
world,  with  land  grant  universities  playing  a
leading  role  in  disseminating  a  vision  of
American modernity and democracy as the apex
of postwar reconstruction. US reports  ᰀdepicted
local Okinawans as happily hauling away rubble
as  U.S.  bulldozers  leveled  the  castle  site, ?
portraying Okinawans as willing participants in
the  project.56  As  Justin  Aukema  argues,  the
building of the university was construed as  ᰀa
symbolic victory of U.S.-led modernity over the
ancient  forces  of  feudalism  and  militarism,  a
condition  that  [Brigadier  General  John  Hinds]
compared to liberation from bondage. ?57
At  least  initially,  this  liberation  entailed  an
erasure of both military and Ryukyuan structures
on the  site.  The  intellectual  work  done  in  the
university would be the continuation of the idea
of liberation. As Hinds wrote in his address at the
opening  ceremony  of  the  University  of  the
Ryukyus,  ᰀThe bulldozers were able to clear the
debris  from  the  location,  but  they  could  not
scrape  away  three  generations  of  moral  and
intellectual subjugation &. The Ryukyuans have
raised a monument to this ideal [of freedom] in
the very building of the University by their own
hands, standing as it does on a war-devastated
eminence  once  dominated  by  a  14th  century
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feudal  castle. ?58  Americans  sought  to  create  a
new Okinawan identity free from the decades of
Japanese  oppression,  but  this  did  not  mean  a
wholesale   ᰀreturn ?  to  pre-Japanese  annexation
traditions. USCAR did not rebuild Shuri Castle,
but built a university in its place. Americans and
their  liberal  allies  lumped together  the  castle ?s
mil i tary  garrison  and  their  Ryukyuan
predecessors as agents of  ᰀfeudal ? subjugation.
American-style  education was intended to free
Okinawans from feudal habits. In January 1955,
USCAR  Governor  General  Lyman  Lemnitzer
wrote,  ᰀLess than one hundred years ago, it was
upon  this  site  that  the  leaders  and  rulers  of
Okinawa  were  born  and  educated  for
responsibilities  of  leadership.  These  were,
however, children born of a privileged class and
in  number  few. ?59  In  contrast,  the  university
students were portrayed as representing a new
kind of  Okinawa:  democratic,  free,  and equal.
Lemnitzer specifically stated that he was against
reconstructing the castle, as  ᰀhe hoped that the
feudalism for which it stood was  ?forever dead. ? ?
As Aukema points out, Lemnitzer also referred
to  the  university  as  a   ᰀnew  national  shrine, ?
thereby  symbolically  replacing  the  Okinawa
Shrine,  and  further  conflating  the  feudal  and
militarist eras.
 
Ryukyu University in Shuri Castle in the 1960s.
Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons
(https:/ / commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/ File:Univ
ersity_of_the_Ryukyus_in_1960s.JPG) .
The move to replace military barracks with study
halls  was  not  unique  to  Shuri  Castle.  The
Americans certainly played a more direct role in
this symbolic transformation in Okinawa, but at
least  seven  other  Japanese  cities  transformed
their  former  military  castles  into  universities
during or immediately after the occupation, and
schools were built in many other castle sites. This
was not the case in former garrisons outside of
castles. Many Imperial Japanese Army and Navy
bases  became  permanent  US  bases  or,  later,
Japanese  Self  Defense  Forces  (JSDF)  bases.  As
Fukubayashi  Tōru argues,  the conversion from
 ᰀmilitary  city ?  into  a  more   ᰀpeace-oriented
identity . . . was never an issue in places like [the
port cities of] Kure, Yokosuka, and Sasebo, where
city life still  revolves around the military. ?60  In
castle towns, however, the association with the
military and samurai class was an important part
of  local  identity,  and  the  transformation  was
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important for their  ᰀreinvention ? in the postwar.
As Imamura Yōichi points out,  ᰀthe conversion
of former military grounds into universities was
endowed,  for  such  castle  towns,  with  much
symbolism. ?61
For instance, the trajectory of Kanazawa Castle is
almost  identical  to  Shuri ?s,  with  the  site
converted first into a university and then back
into  a  castle,  built  with  original  materials  and
local craftsmanship, and becoming the anchor of
a  revived  local  culture.  Kanazawa ?s  official
history prides itself on the transition from  ᰀgunto
into gakuto (military town to university town),
which  symbolized  the  transformation  of  the
city, ?  and the  ᰀbuilding of  a  university  in  the
castle as a symbol of the construction of a nation
of peace and culture. ?62 As in many other sites,
the  US  6th  army  initially  took  over  from  the
Imperial Japanese Army and set up camp in the
existing  barracks.  The  6th  army,  however,
quickly relocated and the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers designated the site for the
building of a university. However, the castle site
became entangled in struggles between the city,
which sought to build a public university, and a
Jōdo  Shinshū  Buddhist  group  that  desired  to
build a religious university in the castle.
The Buddhists wished to commemorate the 450th
anniversary of the building of a temple by Shōnin
Rennyō (1415 ጀ1499), the eighth head priest of the
Honganji  order,  on the  castle  site.  The temple
was destroyed by the armies of the warlord Oda
Nobunaga ?s  (1534-82),  and  the  Buddhists
presented the building of a Buddhist university
as a renunciation of feudalism and an expression
of  their  supposed  centuries-old  hostility  to
militarism. Kanazawa City, which was ultimately
successful in its university project at the expense
of the Buddhists, also used the language of peace
and presented Kanazawa as first and foremost a
university  town.  A  December  1947  petition
invoked   ᰀKanazawa ?s   ?tradition  of  higher
learning, ? its 300 years as a castle town, a baronial
seat of power and a seat of learning, its medical
schools  and  other  universities. ?  These  factors
made Kanazawa  ᰀan ideal space for [supporting]
education  befitting  of  the  construction  of  a
cultural nation and the newly reborn Japan ?s idea
of democracy. ?63
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Kanazawa University in Kanazawa Castle in
1975.
Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.
(https:/ / ja.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ファイ
ル:Kanazawa_univ_jonai_1975.jpg)
 
Unlike the University of the Ryukyus in Shuri,
however,  Kanazawa  University  cherished  its
association with the castle. University brochures
described it as the  ᰀCastle University, ? and  ᰀthe
Birth of the New Kanazawa University, ? which
transformed the site from the  ᰀhome of soldiers
to the home of  students. ?64  In Shuri,  emphasis
was on the erasure of the past,  rather than its
repossession.  In  a  way,  USCAR  was  too
successful  in  pushing  the  idea  of  overcoming
feudalism.  As  USCAR  started  to  encourage  a
separate Ryukyuan identity as a way to forestall
a return of sovereignty to Japan, students in the
University  of  the  Ryukyus  opposed  the
restoration of castle buildings. In the 1959 words
of one Student Council member, rebuilding the
castle would help  ᰀseparate Okinawa from the
homeland (sokoku) [i.e. Japan]. ? For the student
activist,   ᰀShuri  castle  was  a   ᰀsymbol  of
feudalism ? which represented the  ᰀculture of the
rulers  (shihaisha  no  bunka), ?  and,  therefore,
 ᰀconsidering  that  Okinawa  has  not  yet  fully
democratized [...]  is  not  a  cultural  symbol  [...]
that we should be proud of. ?65  This hostility to
reconstruction  echoed  contemporary  trends  in
mainland  Japan,  albeit  with  a  particular
Okinawan  angle.  Left-wing  activists  fought
against  reconstruction  efforts  in  Nagoya,
Hiroshima,  Wakayama,  and  many  other  sites.
Rebuilding castles was seen as a colossal waste of
money at a time when many Japanese were still
struggling  to  obtain  proper  housing.  In
Wakayama,  socialist  MP  Nakatani  Tetsuya
opposed the mayor ?s reconstruction plans with
the slogan  ᰀbread or nostalgia. ?
Nakatani  further  connected  the  building  of
Wakayama  Castle  in  1958  to  the  return  of
feudalism  and  militarism.  In  Wakayama,  and
elsewhere, as Japan was rocked by conflicts over
the  US-Japan  Security  Treaty  (ANPO),  local
resistance to castle projects was entangled with a
struggle over interpretations of the local past. If
local elites saw rebuilding their destroyed castles
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as symbolizing the end of the postwar and the
revival of their towns, the left almost uniformly
saw this  as the revival  of  an elite  culture that
should  be  categorically  opposed.  Historian
Okamoto  Ryōichi  captured  this  sentiment  in
1969,  writing,   ᰀThe  recent  castle  building
planners ? hackneyed slogan that a castle &is the
pride  of  [our]  hometown,  or  a  symbol  of
yearning,  never  tells  [us]  historical  facts  in  an
accurate  way.  Rather,  castles  and  their  keeps
were [built] from blood and tears. Looking up at
that sky-piercing [cruel] tower, our ancestors, the
common people, could not help feeling coercion
and indignation. ?66 In Okinawa, as well, tourism
groups  and  cultural  circles  pushed  for
reconstruction  against  local  resistance.  Seen  in
this  light,  debates  in  Okinawa were  part  of  a
wider struggle over history, where elites tried to
turn aristocratic  culture into popular traditions
and symbols of popular pride, countering earlier
views of the characteristics as  ᰀfeudal. ?
 
Reconstructing history and heritage
Such anti-castle  rhetoric  increasingly  became a
minority opinion in Okinawa and elsewhere as
political  maneuvers  over  the  reversion  of  the
islands to Japan brought back the prospect of the
restoration of the castle with the support of the
Japanese  government.  As  reversion  became  a
reality, two views of Okinawan heritage, and the
castle ?s  place  in  it,  emerged.  Supporters  of
integration  with  Japan,  along  with  prominent
mainland cultural figures, advocated rebuilding
the castle  as  a  Japanese cultural  property.  The
National Diet and other bodies allocated funds
for surveys and later for the reconstruction of the
cast le ,  which  was  eventual ly  bui l t  to
commemorate  the  20th  anniversary  of  the
reversion.67  Other groups within Okinawa now
blamed the Japanese army for the destruction of
the  castle,  arguing  that  the  castle  should
symbolize a unique Ryukyuan identity, separate
from and in opposition to Japan.68
In  1970,  the  Okinawan  Bunkazai  Hogo  Iinkai
(Committee  for  the  Protection  of  Cultural
Properties)  appealed  for  government  funds  to
restore  the  castle,  while  at  the  same  time
positioning  it  as  a  monument  to  peaceful  co-
existence,   ᰀThe  Seiden  [main  hall]  of  Shuri
Castle, ? argued the committee,  ᰀis a monument
to the era of great commerce that our ancestors
actively engaged in five to six hundred years ago
throughout  Southeast  Asia. ?69  The  castle,  a
former  military  site  and  garrison  of  both  the
Ryukyuan kings and the Japanese state, was now
r e c a s t  a s  a  c e n t e r  o f  c o m m e r c e .  T h i s
characterization  developed  during  the
restoration campaign into a powerful narrative of
a  peaceful  Ryukyu  victimized  by  its  various
conquerors,  from Satsuma to  Japan  to  the  US
military.  As  Teruya  Seisho,  one  of  the  main
promoters  of  the  restoration  campaign,  wrote,
 ᰀShuri Castle [was] as unique among castles in
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Japan  and  the  world.  The  old  castles  on  the
mainland  and  abroad  were &marked  by  tall,
fortified  castle  towers  that  evidence  their
function as manifestations of power and military
might while our Ryukyu promptly forbade the
carry ing  o f  swords  and  i s sued  peace
proclamations  before  others  in  the  world.  In
other words,  banning weapons,  we established
benevolence and virtue as national policy. ?70
As Gerald Figal  argues,  this   ᰀmyth of  being a
weaponless state ? increasingly became a central
tenet of Okinawan identity, while Gregory Smits
writes  of  the   ᰀmyth  of  Ryukyuan  pacifism. ?71
Okinawans  undoubtedly  were  and  still  are
victims of history and the greater powers around
them.  Nevertheless,  the  revision  of  Ryukyuan
history was problematic in that it erased Shuri ?s
difficult  relationship  with  other  islands,  and
obscured the  diversity  of  the  region ?s  cultures
and history as they developed through intense
connections  with  Kyushu,  Korea  and  the  East
Asian  maritime  world.7 2  In  addition,  the
trajectory of Shuri Castle was not as unique as
Teruya claimed. Both its past history and modern
recreation were  paralleled in  mainland castles,
many  of  which  did  not  possess   ᰀtall  fortified
towers ? or have any practical military function
for centuries. Even the trope of victimization by
Tokyo  was  an  echo  of  castle  restoration
campaigns in Aizu-Wakamatsu, Shimabara, and
other marginalized regions. In Aizu-Wakamatsu,
a  contentious castle  restoration campaign used
the memory of Aizu ?s defeat at the hands of the
imperial  armies  in  1868.  As  local  historian
Tanaka Matsuo wrote in 1958,  ᰀAizu has known
defeat and sorrow from the eighth century on . . .
All Japanese experienced the bitter taste of defeat
in the last World War, however, [in Aizu] many
are [still] harboring resentment from the time of
the civil war. Aizu ?s Tsuruga Castle is the focus
of  [such feelings]. ?  Aizu native  Hoshi  Ryōichi
echoed  this,  writing  that  the  Satsuma  and
Chōshū  ᰀmassacres of 3,000 people outside Aizu
Castle became the model for Japan ?s invasion of
Asia. ?73
 
The war-damaged keep of Aizu-Wakamatsu
Castle shortly before it was pulled down in
1874.
Image courtesy of the National Diet Library.
The trajectory of conflict and contradiction,
which characterized mainland castles as well as
Shuri, continued into the physical reconstruction
of the castle. For many Okinawans, the
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reconstruction of the castle and its recognition by
UNESCO were sources of great pride in their
heritage. At the same time, this process erased
much of the more difficult history of Shuri Castle
and Okinawa as a whole. As elsewhere in Japan,
the desire to erase the modern military past and
recover pre-imperial heritage was strong in
Okinawa, and in the 1980s it was agreed to move
Ryukyu University to another site and to rebuild
the original Shuri Castle using traditional
techniques and materials. The focus at Shuri
Castle was placed squarely on its older
Ryukyuan heritage before the turmoil of the
modern period. The castle was built under the
slogan,  ᰀOkinawa ?s postwar will not end unless
Shuri Castle is rebuilt. ?74 Castles throughout
Japan were built using versions of this slogan.
The rebuilding was intended to restore stability
and recover the feelings of furusato (hometown)
that was lost in the destructive wave of modern
warfare and urbanization. In Hiroshima, Nagoya,
Wakayama, as well as at Shuri, the reconstruction
of the castle was presented as the recovery of a
lost past. Samurai parades, Shinto dedication
ceremonies, and castle festivals with local dances
and enthusiastic popular celebrations were
aimed at showing that castle reconstructions
were expressions of the popular will. In Nagoya,
pro-castle campaigners connected the loss of the
castle keep with  ᰀthe loss of stability during the
postwar confusion. [Therefore] popular
sentiment demanded the rebuilding of the
symbol of our hometown. ?75 Shuri Castle ?s
reconstruction in 1989 followed this well-trodden
path as the groundbreaking ceremony (kikōshiki)
was accompanied by the Kunigami Lumber-
Carrying Ceremony Festival
(https://chaari.wordpress.com/2019/11/16/tra
nsporting-lumber-for-the-restoration-of-shuri-
castle/?fbclid=IwAR0JnTSkBKxs9_Z2OShkMTzz
YNBeP_edB6xhEdJ_avrbW9yCGRgj8Xx51Zg), in
which timber from local villages was carried
down the Naha main street, joined by local
performers, folk dances, and cries of  ᰀthis is the
lumber of the heavenly lord of Shuri. ?
In Shuri, such festivals were seen by some as
manipulation by local elites and the Japanese
government of popular feelings of local pride.
Furthermore, the coupling of the reconstruction
with the reversion anniversary was controversial.
Like the student activists before them, anti-base
and local activists broke with the prefecture over
what they saw as an overemphasis on tourism
development. For many Okinawans, carrying
 ᰀlumber for heavenly the lords of the castle ?
evoked little pride. In echoes of Wakayama,
several groups demanded investment in the
welfare of Okinawans rather than in the castle. A
local resident remarked in an interview,  ᰀThe
national and prefectural government have been
reconstructing Shurijyo (sic.), an ancient castle in
Okinawa, but the move has nothing to do with
our common lives &the image of Okinawa
should be one that reflects the realities of
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imposed, like the castle. ?76 Similarly, local
activists from Shuri itself formed the Association
of Residents Concerned over the Shuri Castle
Park Project (Shurijō Kōen Jigyō ni Kakaru Jūmin
no Kai) that vehemently opposed the rebuilding.
The group astutely used war imagery and
Okinawa and Hiroshima ?s victimization in
portraying the reconstruction as an elite project
that ignored local grievances,  ᰀsuggesting that
while Shuri Castle was destroyed in the war, its
rebuilding now will destroy the daily life of
people in the area. ?77
By tying the site ?s military past to its own
struggle against tourism-driven development,
the association pointed out that the restoration of
the castle was also an act of erasure. As left wing
assembly members in Okinawa noted, the neglect
of the command bunkers underneath the castle
meant that the prefecture was literally burying
the castle ?s painful history underneath its
restored splendor.78 The Shuri reconstruction was
completed in 1992, the same year that Japan ?s
most famous castle, Himeji Castle, became one of
the nation ?s first two UNESCO World Heritage
sites. Himeji Castle had also served as a major
military base until 1945, and this legacy has also
been largely erased as the public history of the
site focuses almost entirely on the pre-modern
period. Another former military base, Hiroshima
Castle, has similarly removed most traces of the
modern military, and its focal point is a 1950s
concrete reconstruction of the keep that was
destroyed by the atomic bomb. Similar concrete
keeps are now being torn down in favor of
 ᰀauthentic ᴀ wooden structures. This is a further
act of erasure, this time of the postwar castle
boom.
 
Conclusions
The issues of authenticity discussed in the case of
Notre  Dame are  also  important  in  the  case  of
Japanese castles, but they are compounded by the
fraught modern history of these very prominent
sites. The great keep of Nagoya Castle, the largest
in Japan until its destruction by US bombs, was
rebuilt out of concrete in the late 1950s, and that
structure is now being demolished to make way
for an  ᰀauthentic ? wooden reconstruction to be
completed by 2022 at  a cost  of  more than 500
million US dollars. At the same time, its modern
history has been largely erased, as Nagoya Castle
also served as a major garrison until 1945. The
same  is  true  of  the  Imperial  Palace  in  Tokyo
(https://blog.royalhistsoc.org/2019/04/30/the-e
mperor-his-castle-and-modern-japan/%20),
which  was  the  central  site  of  the  imperial
succession ceremonies that marked the beginning
of the Reiwa Period in May 2019.86 The legacy of
the site as the Imperial Castle and garrison of the
Imperial Guard through the Second World War
is largely obscured. Osaka Castle, another former
military  base,  refurbished  its  popular  concrete
keep in the late 1990s, and Prime Minister Abe
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Shinzo was roundly criticized for  mocking the
presence of elevators in the castle during the G20
Summit in June 2019. This controversy reflected
tensions  between  authenticity  and  accessibility
that are also erupting in Nagoya.
 
The concrete Nagoya Castle keep in January
2018,
shortly before being closed for reconstruction
from wood.
Photo by the authors.
The  recent  burning  of  Shuri  Castle  not  only
sparked  reminders  of  Notre  Dame,  but  also
brought  memories  of  images  of  the  wartime
destruction  of  Nagoya  Castle  and  other
important heritage sites. The cycles of destruction
and reconstruction of Shuri Castle should be seen
in  the  context  of  broader  developments
concerning  castles  in  modern  Japan.  As  we
discuss  in  our  recent  book,  Japan ?s  Castles:
Citadels of Modernity in War and Peace, castles
in many regions in Japan have served as both
symbols of connection to the nation, as well as
symbols  of  a  local  identity  opposed  to  the
oppressive  and  even  violent  power  of  Tokyo.
Shuri  Castle  also  reflects  these  dynamics.  As
attention turns towards the reconstruction of the
structures that were lost in October 2019, old and
new controversies over the site may well come to
the  fore.  Concerns  over  authenticity  may  be
sidelined  by  larger  debates  concerning  the
humanitarian,  political,  and  symbolic  issues
surrounding Shuri Castle ?s turbulent and tragic
modern history.
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(https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subje
cts/history/east-asian-history/japans-castles-
citadels-modernity-war-and-
peace?localeText=United+States&locale=en_U
S&query=)
Book cover for Japan ?s Castles: Citadels of
Modernity in War and Peace
(https:/ / www.cambridge.org/ us/ academic/ subjec
ts/ history/ east-asian-history/ japans-castles-
citadels-modernity-war-and-
peace?localeText=United+States&locale=en_US
&query=)
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